Prompt notification of a detainee’s impending transfer to Pakistan, including the authorities that will receive and have custody of the detainee, and the location of detention is a basic, easy-toimplement measure that will not only bring detainees and their families peace of mind, but also help ensure detainees’ rights are protected. c) U.S. Security Concerns The United States is seeking security assurances from Pakistan to address concerns that repatriated detainees may “engage in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners” upon release. 162 However, it is important that security assessments are realistic and accurate, and that the United States avoid exaggerated fears of “recidivism,” which stalled the repatriation of Guantanamo Bay detainees. The Pakistani government also has an extensive security apparatus, legislative framework, and well-developed law enforcement capabilities, which could be better utilized to provide assurances. Finally, the United States should balance any security concerns against the significant legal, moral, and political costs of continuing to hold detainees in indefinite detention without trial. 1. Avoiding Overstated Fears of Recidivism U.S. concerns that repatriated detainees may engage in hostilities against the United States in the future—termed “re-engagement” or “recidivism”—must be addressed in order to repatriate detainees. However, the assessment of the recidivism risk of Pakistani detainees considered for repatriation should be rigorous and based on credible evidence, not politics or speculation. First and foremost, it is necessary to acknowledge that not all detainees represent a risk of reengaging in militancy upon release. 163 Some detainees have been wrongfully detained, having never engaged in hostilities against U.S. forces, as the cases of Jibran, who was released in 2009, and two Pakistani detainees released in August 2012 have demonstrated. 164 U.S. officials’ stated security concerns often overlook this category of detainees, and inaccurately characterize all detainees as posing some level of threat or risk of “recidivism” that must be mitigated through security assurances. 162 Department of Defense internal policy memorandums, http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/bagram20100514/07bagrampolicy_30-92.pdf. 163 The Constitution Project, “The Report of The Constitution Project’s Task force on Detainee Treatment”, 16 April, 2013, http://detaineetaskforce.org/read/files/assets/common/downloads/The%20Report%20of%20The%20Constitu tion%20Project.pdf, p. 295. 164 A U.S. military official apologized to Jibran for his detention and recognized they had no grounds to detain him. One of the detainees released in 2012 declined to be interviewed for the report. Based on past conversations with him and his family, he was held on the sole basis of an accusation—later proven to be false—by an Afghan co-worker. The other detainee could not be contacted. However, a U.S. government official confirmed that he was being held hostage by militants in Afghanistan when the U.S. military stormed the compound and detained all its occupants. 42