group of detainees at a time has made it difficult to build on past successes and to standardize terms of repatriation. Certain U.S. government officials have expressed concern that “precious time is being wasted” and the United States runs a real risk of creating “another Guantanamo”, where detainees are held indefinitely without charge, trial or legal representation and are unable to return to their home countries. 218 While negotiations over the repatriation of Pakistani detainees have dragged on for years, hamstrung by a lack of political will, bureaucratic delays, and a failure to engage on substantive issues, U.S. and Pakistani negotiations over Pakistani citizens held in Guantanamo Bay, have shown that timely, high-level engagement can yield results. Between 2003 and 2004, a broad agreement forged by high-level officials in the U.S and Pakistani governments, including representatives from both the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interior, led to the repatriation 63 of Pakistani citizens from Guantanamo Bay. 219 However, for DFIP detainees, Pakistan has relied instead on what one U.S. official called a “snowfall” of routine diplomatic notes. 220 For years, Pakistani efforts to secure the release and repatriation of detainees were limited to these diplomatic notes, which focused on requesting names of detainees, charges, and consular access, and did little to advance negotiations on the humane treatment and security assurances necessary for repatriation. 221 Finally, in January 2012, the Lahore High Court ordered the Pakistani government to commence negotiations with the U.S. government. 222 In response, the Pakistani government formed an interministerial committee or “Bagram Committee,” tasked with coordinating Pakistani efforts and negotiating detainees’ repatriation. On 9 July, 2012, the committee met with U.S. embassy officials and discussed the possibility of negotiating a mechanism to arrange for the transfer of detainees. 223 Pakistani government officials present at the meeting claimed their U.S. counterparts were vague and did not give clear answers as to the possibilities of repatriation, insisting that such a decision will be taken in Washington. 224 Though the “Bagram Committee” formed by the Pakistani government at the very least reflected a willingness to engage with the U.S. government, it has been relatively ineffective. Since its formation, the committee has only met twice. 225 Some of its members were not provided with even the most basic information regarding the detention of Pakistani citizens at the DFIP, such as the number of detainees, the legal basis for their detention or the background of U.S.-Pakistan negotiations and repatriations. 226 Since the Bagram committee met in July 2012 no further negotiations between the U.S. government and the committee have taken place. 227 Recent court 218 Justice Project Pakistan interview with a U.S. government official (name, date, location withheld). Guantanamo Docket Timeline, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline; U.S. diplomatic cable, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06ISLAMABAD17261.html. 220 Justice Project Pakistan interview with a U.S. government official (name, date, location withheld). 221 Diplomatic Notes obtained through Sultana Noon v. Federation of Pakistan. 222 Sultana Noon v. Federation of Pakistan order dated 21 January, 2012 223 Report filed by the MFA in Sultana Noon v. Federation of Pakistan, 11 July, 2012. 224 Justice Project Pakistan interview with Pakistani government officials (names, dates, locations withheld). 225 Justice Project Pakistan interview with Pakistani government officials (names, dates, locations withheld). 226 Ibid. 227 Justice Project Pakistan interview with Pakistani government officials (names, dates, locations withheld). 219 51

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