statements to the DRB and present documentary evidence. 33 A closed session then follows, where only U.S. military personnel are allowed and classified evidence is presented, denying the detainee the possibility to challenge evidence brought against him. 34 This includes hearsay evidence gathered by U.S. informants or personnel and intelligence files, including photographs and audio/video recordings. 35 At no time are detainees permitted to consult or communicate with a lawyer, even those that are represented by outside counsel. JPP has sought to communicate directly with its clients at DFIP for the past three years, which the DOD continues to deny. Upon reviewing a detainee’s case, the DRB issues a recommendation of continued internment, release or transfer for criminal prosecution or participation in a reintegration programme. The commanding officer of the DFIP then decides whether to approve the DRB’s recommendation or not. 36 For most Afghan detainees, a recommendation for release or prosecution often led to being transferred out of U.S. detention—and a final disposition of their case. For TCNs however, a recommendation for repatriation to their home country or resettlement in a third country brings no such resolution. It is only the beginning of a long, politicized process. Before any transfer can take place, the United States and receiving states must come to an agreement on several critical issues. 37 The first step is confirmation of the detainee’s nationality, which has taken years in some cases. In an effort to fulfill its non-refoulement obligations under international law, the United States then requests humane treatment assurances from the receiving State. 38 Non-refoulement prohibits a State from transferring an individual to another State where he may face a real risk of torture or inhumane treatment. 39 Much like the prohibition on torture, it is an absolute principle allowing for no exceptions. 40 According to international case-law, diplomatic assurances alone do not satisfy a State’s international legal obligation. 41 If such assurances are requested, they must be put in context with other relevant factors, such as the political and human rights situation of the receiving State. They must also be credible enough to mitigate the risk of torture or ill-treatment, by for example 33 Department of Defense internal policy memorandums, http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/bagram20100514/07bagrampolicy_30-92.pdf, ps. 5-7. 34 Ibid. 35 Human Rights First, “Detained and Denied in Afghanistan: How to Make U.S. Detention Comply with the Law”, May 2011, ps. 9-10. 36 http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/bagram20100514/07bagrampolicy_30-92.pdf, p. 7 37 CM No. 3196/2011 in WP No. 21073/2010 Ms. Sultana Noon vs. Federation of Pakistan, para. 4; Reply filed by the MFA in Sultana Noon vs. Federation of Pakistan, 11 July, 2012, para. 9. 38 Diplomatic Note No. 2011/12 POL, US Embassy Islamabad to MFA, 23 May 2012. 39 Article 3(1) United Nations Convention Against Torture. 40 Human Rights Watch, “Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture”, April 2005, p. 7. Note however that Article 32(1) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees allows for expulsion on national security grounds. 41 See Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber, 15 November, 1996, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58004#{"itemid":["00158004"]}; Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003; Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, UN Human Rights Committee, 10 November 2006; Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber, 28 February, 2008, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-85276#{"itemid":["001-85276"]}; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, European Court of Human Rights Chamber, 17 January, 2012, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108629#{"itemid":["001-108629"]} 14