enforcement agencies to investigate and imprison individuals deemed suspicious of terrorist activity within its borders.32 Darryl Li argues this reinforcing of unchecked power domestically then became a feature of the ‘global war on terror’ overseas, where terrorists were considered stateless and not afforded the rights granted to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.33 As the US government operated with hegemonic power, universal laws of war were left suspended. To support these changes, a discourse emerged domestically and internationally in favour of suspicion alone as criteria for apprehension, indefinite detention over time-bound imprisonment, and the justification of torture during interrogation to obtain testimony. Of particular note are the ways in which habeas corpus was denied to Muslim prisoners of war, based on the argument that their religious identity alone meant proclivity toward recidivism. As Li shows, relationships of sovereignty between states were reorganized under the global war on terror in which Pakistan, as a client state, allowed the US to inform how it dispensed justice when dealing with its own citizens. In the DFIP, then, such provisions actualized the DRB’s power to flout and manipulate previously normative processes of legal representation and judicial proceedings. Agamben notes that Bush’s creation in 2001 of the category of the detainee produces for the first time “non-citizens”, “neither prisoners nor persons”, and “legally unnamable and unclassifiable being[s]”. The creation of such a category is the result of a debate that takes place in legal philosophy about the need for laws in ‘exceptional’ political circumstances that sit outside the legal system itself, in order to manage the former. Universal legal frameworks are suspended in the name of law, leaving behind an absence of law, yet buttressed by the “force of law”. Through this utter deprivation of any legal relationship with a state, the detainee category “abandons the living being to law” (our emphasis).34 In Bagram prison, it was therefore possible to strip detainees of rights generally afforded to an individual under trial, including the identification of definitive charges, legal representation, and information about their confinement. During this time, Pakistani detainees reported being beaten, psychologically abused, and degraded — and their faith was often the object of ridicule. They were also subjected to what has been euphemistically termed ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ including being forced to maintain painful stress positions, the use of sleep deprivation, and sensory exposure such as enduring extreme temperatures. In this suspended space and time of denied personhood, detainees could be held indefinitely. Prior to their detainment, it is not as though abductees from Pakistan were individuals with full personhood as far as the state was concerned. A historic state of exception covering two centuries of ideologically driven forms of law, governance and securitization in the region explain the Pakistani government’s unwillingness to protect its citizens detained in Bagram prison. Imtiaz Ali (2018) outlines how the British administration chose to rule the frontier indirectly, giving tribal leaders and appointed political agents semi-autonomous power in exchange for defense of the Afghan border. Their power to maintain law and order in the region was codified under the FCR,  https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm  Li, Darry. “Sovereignty, Carceral Circulation, and the Global War on Terror,” From Exception to Empire. Durham. Duke University Press. 2018. 34  Agamben, Giorgio. States of Exception. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 2005. 32 33 13