Negotiations for transfer and control of the DFIP from U.S. to Afghan authorities began in 2010. As these dragged on and the United States continued to maintain control over the facility and the detainees, the Afghan government increasingly viewed the handover as a matter of national sovereignty. 18 After several deadlines for the transfer of authority passed without a successful handover, the Afghan government made control over the DFIP and Afghan detainees a precondition for a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). 19 The SPA provides a framework for continued cooperation between the U.S. and Afghan governments after the 2014 drawdown. 20 It is also the basis for negotiations of the Bilateral Security Agreement, which will authorize and govern the U.S. military presence and operations in Afghanistan post-2014. 21 On 9 March, 2012, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (Detentions MoU) to transfer control of the DFIP from the U.S. to the Afghan government within six months. 22 However, disagreements over the meaning of key provisions of the Detentions MoU arose, relating to detention authority over future captures and the adoption of an Afghan internment regime. As a result, the United States failed to hand over full control of the DFIP within the specified timeframe and suspended the detainee transfer process. 23 By late March 2013, six months after the initial handover deadline had passed, the U.S. and Afghan governments signed a new MoU which—according to the Afghan government—does not authorize detention without trial and does not grant the United States a veto on detainee releases. 24 Both governments announced that they had finally resolved their differences and completed the transfer of the DFIP and its approximately 3,000 Afghan detainees. 25 However, the highly troubled handover of the DFIP only impacted Afghan detainees. 26 The United States continues to have custody and full authority over roughly 60 TCNs, seemingly in contravention 18 “US unveils Bagram handover plan”, Al-Jazeera English, 27 February, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2010/02/2010227134828232750.html. 19 Kate Clark, “The Bagram Memorandum: Handing over ‘the Other Guantanamo’”, The Afghanistan Analysts Network, 21 March, 2012, www.aan-afghanistan.com/print.asp?id=2619. 20 Emma-Graham Harrison, “Afghanistan and US agree on strategic partnership document”, The Guardian, 22 April, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/22/afghanistan-us-strategic-partnership-document. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Open Society Foundations, “Remaking Bagram: The creation of an Afghan internment regime and the Divide over U.S. detention power”, 6 September, 2012, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/BagramReportEnglish.pdf; “US army hands over Bagram”, BBC News, 25 March, 2013. 24 Kate Clark, “The Other Guantanamo 5: A New MoU for Bagram and, Finally a Handover”, The Afghanistan Analysts Network, 24 March 2013, www.aan-afghanistan.org/print.asp?id=3310. Unlike the 2012 MoU, the 2013 is a classified document. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the 2013 MoU actually resolves the core disputes between the two governments that led to the initial suspension of the handover - including the legality of internment under Afghan law, U.S. veto power over releases and the process for handling detainees captured in post-handover U.S. operations. 25 “US army hands over Bagram” BBC News, 25 March, 2013. 26 Open Society Foundations, “Remaking Bagram: The creation of an Afghan internment regime and the Divide over U.S. detention power”, 6 September, 2012, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/BagramReportEnglish.pdf. The 2012 MoU is vaguely worded and does not explicitly exclude TCNs from handover of detainees from the U.S. to Afghan authority; however, Afghan and U.S. officials at the time agreed separately that the 2012 MoU did not apply to TCNs. Given that the MoU signed in 2013 is classified, it is unknown whether it too carves out an exception for continued U.S. detention of TCNs. 12