permanent residence. 210 Section 11-EE(2) ATA 1997 also authorizes the government to forbid a
person from visiting certain locations such as schools or public processions, and to order an inquiry
into a listed person’s financial assets. 211 Furthermore, the government can order that any activity of
a person listed under Schedule IV be monitored. 212
Under the Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013 (IFTA 2013), passed in February 2013 the Pakistani
government can now request a warrant for surveillance of a person where there is a “reasonable
threat or possibility of an attempt to commit a scheduled offence”, including offences under the ATA
1997. 213 Surveillance under the IFTA 2013 includes interception of telecommunications such as emails, SMS and calls as well as use of covert surveillance and human intelligence. 214 In addition to
providing legal cover for an activity that Pakistani intelligence agencies have long engaged in,
information collected under a lawful warrant for surveillance under the IFTA 2013 is admissible as
evidence at trial. 215
These laws grant the Pakistani government significant power to monitor released detainees.
However, both the U.S. and Pakistani governments must also take care to ensure that these
measures are applied in a reasonable, lawful manner that does not violate detainees’ rights. In
practice, such measures can also lead to harassment of repatriated detainees by security and
intelligence officials, stifling detainees’ attempts at reintegration in normal life and further alienating
them from society. 216 All detainees enjoy a presumption of innocence and full procedural guarantees
under Pakistani law. The imposition of such security measures should fully respect the procedural
guarantees provided under Pakistani law and be based on evidence that is admissible and complies
with the standards of evidence in Pakistani law. 217 Mere detention at the DFIP should not be
sufficient ground to order security measures.
d) Ad Hoc Negotiations and Lack of Clear Policies
Both the United States and Pakistan have largely failed to craft clear and consistent policies on
repatriating detainees. Instead, they have engaged in ad hoc negotiations, significantly prolonging
detention and leaving detainees’ fates uncertain. Focusing on single individuals or a small, limited
210
Section 11-EE(2)(a),(b),(c) Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.
Sections 11-EE(2)(d), (e) Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.
212
Section 11-EE(2)(f) Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.
213
Sections 10(1), 16 Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013.
214
Section 16 Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013.
215
Section 23 Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013.
216
Justice Project Pakistan interviews with ex-DFIP and Guantanamo Bay detainees (names, dates, locations
withheld); Justice Project Pakistan conversations with the lawyer of an ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee on
Schedule IV (name, date, location withheld); See also University of Berkeley, “Guantanamo and its aftermath”
ps. 61-62; University of Berkeley, “Returning home”, ps. 3-5. Ex-detainees have reported law enforcement
officials requesting bribes and curtailing their freedom of movement beyond what is authorized by the law.
217
See Article 9 Constitution of Pakistan, 1973; Hassan Nasir vs. The Crown PLD 1953 Sind 37; Amatul Jalil
Khwaja and others vs. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2003 Lahore 310; Mulazim Hussain Shah vs. Province of
Punjab PLD 2006 Lahore 108; Malik Ashraf Awan vs. Government of the Punjab 2006 YLR 376; Abdul Rauf vs.
Chief Commissioner Islamabad PLD 2006 Lahore 111; Mamoona Saeed v. Government of Punjab PLD 2007
Lahore 128; Aneera Khanum vs. Government of the Punjab 2007 P Cr. LJ 527; Province of Sindh vs. Roshan Deen
PLD 2008 Supreme Court 132; Hafiz Muhammad Saeed vs. Government of the Punjab 2009 YLR 2475;
Muhammad Nadeem vs. Government of Punjab PLD 2010 Lahore 371; Khwaja Mureed Hussain vs. Government
of the Punjab 2013 P Cr. L J 312.
211
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