government 10 days ahead of time. The law also requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct
individual threat assessments of transferees, assess the security environment of the receiving
country for detainees transferred for release and produce a report on recidivism of DFIP
detainees. 251 The measures included in NDAA 2013—which have some similarities to those put in
place to block President Obama’s efforts to shutter Guantanamo Bay—raise concerns that
Congressional frustrations over the U.S.-Pakistan relations and exaggerated fears of recidivism will
delay or potentially block the repatriation of detainees and resolution of their cases. In the context
of Guantanamo detainees, Congress has imposed a full ban on transfers to the United States, even
for prosecution, and has put in place multi-faceted certification requirements that must be met prior
to any transfer abroad. While the DFIP transfer requirements are much less extensive, the mere
threat of imposing significant Congressionally-mandated restrictions on detainee transfers may
affect the negotiation process and hamstring U.S. officials in assessing assurances and conducting
unbiased, balanced threat assessments. 252
The NDAA for fiscal year 2014 suggests a risk of continued congressional movement in this direction.
The House of Representatives adopted language that requires more detailed reporting on recidivism
of DFIP detainees, which suggests a gradual escalation in the rhetorical battle over DFIP transfers if
not the actual legal requirements for transfer. 253The focus on recidivism signals that too little
attention has been paid to the costs of continuing to hold such detainees and the actual security
threat they pose, prolonging their detention and creating further hurdles for their repatriation.
Finally, there are indications that the United States is seeking to extend its authority to detain TCNs
in Afghanistan past the 2014 end of combat operations by incorporating new terms into the Bilateral
Security Agreement (BSA) being negotiated with the Afghan government. 254 The extension of such
authority would be a troubling development. It would contradict the U.S. intention to end detention
operations in Afghanistan, as stated in the Detentions MoU between the U.S. and Afghan
governments, and would risk condemning TCNs to the same legal and political limbo and indefinite
detention that has befallen Guantanamo Bay detainees.
251
Sections 1025(b)(1), 1026 NDAA 2013.
“Statement by the President on H.R. 4310”, 3 January, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310.
253
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, House of Representatives, 14 June, 2013,
http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/2013/06/14/house-section/article/H3594-6 (Rep. Buck
McKeon: “Finally, what he will do with the high-value terrorists still held in Afghanistan? This is a particularly
critical priority for me. There are several extremely dangerous individuals still in custody in Afghanistan. The
only option that I see, as completely unacceptable for those detainees, is to allow their release. We've already
seen the outcome of making this tragic mistake in Iraq.”).
254
Sieff, “In Afghanistan, a second Guantanamo.”
252
55
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