government 10 days ahead of time. The law also requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct individual threat assessments of transferees, assess the security environment of the receiving country for detainees transferred for release and produce a report on recidivism of DFIP detainees. 251 The measures included in NDAA 2013—which have some similarities to those put in place to block President Obama’s efforts to shutter Guantanamo Bay—raise concerns that Congressional frustrations over the U.S.-Pakistan relations and exaggerated fears of recidivism will delay or potentially block the repatriation of detainees and resolution of their cases. In the context of Guantanamo detainees, Congress has imposed a full ban on transfers to the United States, even for prosecution, and has put in place multi-faceted certification requirements that must be met prior to any transfer abroad. While the DFIP transfer requirements are much less extensive, the mere threat of imposing significant Congressionally-mandated restrictions on detainee transfers may affect the negotiation process and hamstring U.S. officials in assessing assurances and conducting unbiased, balanced threat assessments. 252 The NDAA for fiscal year 2014 suggests a risk of continued congressional movement in this direction. The House of Representatives adopted language that requires more detailed reporting on recidivism of DFIP detainees, which suggests a gradual escalation in the rhetorical battle over DFIP transfers if not the actual legal requirements for transfer. 253The focus on recidivism signals that too little attention has been paid to the costs of continuing to hold such detainees and the actual security threat they pose, prolonging their detention and creating further hurdles for their repatriation. Finally, there are indications that the United States is seeking to extend its authority to detain TCNs in Afghanistan past the 2014 end of combat operations by incorporating new terms into the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) being negotiated with the Afghan government. 254 The extension of such authority would be a troubling development. It would contradict the U.S. intention to end detention operations in Afghanistan, as stated in the Detentions MoU between the U.S. and Afghan governments, and would risk condemning TCNs to the same legal and political limbo and indefinite detention that has befallen Guantanamo Bay detainees. 251 Sections 1025(b)(1), 1026 NDAA 2013. “Statement by the President on H.R. 4310”, 3 January, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310. 253 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, House of Representatives, 14 June, 2013, http://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/2013/06/14/house-section/article/H3594-6 (Rep. Buck McKeon: “Finally, what he will do with the high-value terrorists still held in Afghanistan? This is a particularly critical priority for me. There are several extremely dangerous individuals still in custody in Afghanistan. The only option that I see, as completely unacceptable for those detainees, is to allow their release. We've already seen the outcome of making this tragic mistake in Iraq.”). 254 Sieff, “In Afghanistan, a second Guantanamo.” 252 55

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