CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Pakistani nationals detained in Bagram were working class, underprivileged men. Most were the sole breadwinners for their families and had no known links with any terrorist organizations. The families of the detainees had no knowledge of their whereabouts for months, and sometimes years. When they discovered that their sons, brothers, and fathers were in Bagram, families did not have the resources or the means to travel to Afghanistan to see them or communicate with them from Pakistan. The detainees in Bagram were kept in as much uncertainty as their families. Often, they did not know where they were or where they were being taken. No one knew when, or whether, they would be released. They were denied communication with their families until much later, when they were given permission to exchange letters and have phone and video calls, all of which were censored and monitored, under threat that this privilege could be revoked at a moment’s notice for any transgression. Detainees’ accounts ranged from going to Afghanistan in search of work due to limited opportunities in Pakistan to inadvertently ending up there, having crossed porous, unmarked borders, to some directly admitting to crossing the border to fight the jihad. These differences, however, did not matter to the Pakistan government which was willing to abandon its citizens to the mercy of American authorities. Treating trauma Upon return, detainees did not receive any form of government support for their rehabilitation or reintegration into society. In fact, they experienced the opposite: harassment by security agencies, and many, despite not having been charged with any crimes in Bagram, endured further imprisonment in Pakistani jails and detention centers upon return. When finally allowed to return to their families, many were put on the Fourth Schedule (see page 11), meaning their movement was restricted and they had to routinely report their whereabouts to police. Such treatment of returnees who are suspected of leaving their countries to join militant activity is not unique to Pakistan. Around the world, governments have chosen restrictive forms of legislation against terrorism, including, as Jawaid lists, “revoking travel documents, criminalising travel to conflict zones, expanding the scope for surveillance and extradition, and broadening prosecutorial powers”. Such approaches also comprise Pakistan’s approach within the context of how it has historically governed and securitized FATA. Instead, the government of Pakistan needs to take an interest in the rehabilitation and reintegration of its returned citizens. 59

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