request. Such participation could help provide background information on the detainee or a
commitment to negotiate terms of repatriation with the U.S. government, thereby increasing the
chances a detainee is recommended for transfer. As one Pakistani government official stated,
detainees sometimes nominate Pakistan embassy staff as witnesses but Pakistani officials decline to
participate, claiming they “have nothing to say.” 184
Without meaningful involvement of their relatives, legal counsel or the Pakistani government,
Pakistani detainees are left to fend for themselves, unable to present exculpatory evidence or
mitigate U.S. threat perceptions. Furthermore, information available to the U.S. military regarding a
detainee’s character or the ability of the Pakistani government to implement security measures is
partial at best, and non-existent at worst. Consequently, security assessments of Pakistani detainees
are incomplete, based not on a comprehensive and detailed understanding of a detainee’s
propensity to engage in militancy or terrorism and of existing mechanisms mitigating perceived
threats, but a wholly one-sided impression built on evidence that is near impossible for the detainee
to challenge.
Crucially, it also appears that an overemphasis on the alleged security threat detainees may pose,
worsened by the systematic lack of adequate due process provided to detainees, leads to too little
consideration of the profound legal, moral and political consequences of indefinite detention. By
continuing to detain individuals to guard against the statistically low possibility of recidivism, and
denying detainees fundamental due process rights, the United States deals a serious blow to its
international credibility and moral authority. 185 As a result, the U.S. government will find it
increasingly difficult to engage with its partners in the region as many will perceive a doublestandard in the U.S. government’s line of thought: advocating respect for human rights, yet
detaining individuals without charge or trial. 186 In the past, disagreements regarding Guantanamo
Bay and the practice of indefinite detention have caused substantial rifts between the U.S. and allied
governments. 187 With little progress on their cases, the continued detention of TCNs at the DFIP has
the potential to be as divisive as Guantanamo Bay and cause profound discord between the United
States and key allies.
3. Security and Anti-Terrorism Mechanisms in Pakistan
For detainees who are deemed by the U.S. government to represent a threat to the United States
after their release, it is necessary to acknowledge that Pakistan has a robust counter-terrorism legal
framework and an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, capable of mitigating U.S. fears.
184
Justice Project Pakistan interview with a Pakistani government official (name, date, location withheld)
Rosa Brooks, “Let them go”, Foreign Policy, 28 March, 2013,
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/28/let_them_go?page=full.
186
Human Rights First, “How to close Guantanamo: blueprint for the next administration”, December 2012, p.1
The Constitution Project, “The Report of The Constitution Project”, ps. 278-279; Peter Foster, “Barack Obama:
close Guantanamo as it is damaging America”, Telegraph, 30 April, 2013,
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/10028946/Barack-Obama-close-Guantanamo-as-it-isdamaging-America.html.
187
“Close Guantanamo camp, Hain says”, BBC News, 17 February, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4722408.stm; “UK told US won’t shut Guantanamo”, BBC News,
11 May, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4760365.stm.
185
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