allowing for effective monitoring mechanisms upon return. 42 The U.S. government also requires security guarantees from receiving States to ensure that repatriated detainees do not re-engage in terrorism or militancy and no longer represent a threat to the United States and its allies. Lastly, detainees must secure an exit visa from the Afghan authorities. Even though the U.S. government has been holding TCNs for over a decade in detention without trial, it has failed to craft regular policies or strike agreements with TCN home country governments. Despite over ten years of grappling with this issue, the U.S. and Pakistani governments still have no clear, consistent bilateral processes and policies for securing the release and repatriation of detainees. d) Litigation efforts Human rights organizations and independent observers have decried the lack of adequate due process guarantees under the DRB system and observed that detainees do not have a meaningful option to challenge their detention. 43 For TCNs, the deficiencies in due process are particularly acute. PRs are generally unable to conduct full investigations as most of the detainee’s families and relations are residing in foreign countries. Because their witnesses and other evidence are located outside of Afghanistan, TCNs are also generally unable to present witnesses and challenge U.S. military determinations. Since negotiations on assurances are held strictly between the U.S. government and the receiving State, TCNs have little understanding of the negotiation process and limited input into the humanitarian assurances that will protect them upon their return. These serious deficiencies in the due process afforded detainees have led to several litigation efforts to ensure that detainees’ rights are protected and that their continued detention is in compliance with international law. In September 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (DC) entertained a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Yemeni detainee Fadi Al-Maqaleh. 44 In 2009, Judge John D. Bates held that DFIP detainees were entitled to the same habeas corpus review as those detained in Guantanamo Bay. The decision was later overturned in May 2010 by a DC District Court of Appeal, which distinguished detentions at the DFIP on two grounds: the United States has shown no intention of permanently remaining at Bagram and the DFIP is located in an active war zone. Applying the 2010 decision of the Court of Appeal, Judge Bates dismissed the habeas petitions of the 42 Ibid. Amnesty International, “The ‘New’ Bagram Unveiled: But Will There be Change”, 23 November, 2009, http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/comments/22159; Andrea Prasow, “The Bagram Detainee Review Boards: Better, But Still Falling Short”, 1 June, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/02/bagram-detainee-reviewboards-better-still-falling-short; Human Rights First, “Detained and denied in Afghanistan”, p. 13; Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and Open Society Foundations, “Torture, Transfers, and Denial of Due Process: The Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghanistan”, March 17, 2012, http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/AIHRC%20OSF%20Detentions%20Report%20English%20Final%2017-32012.pdf. 44 International Justice Network, Al-Maqaleh Client Overview, http://www.ijnetwork.org/clients/226-fadi-almaqaleh. 43 15